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traordinary methods of equity.1 4 This theory which underlies the Rule
decision is supported by the numerical weight of authority and the trend
of recent cases.
The Tailby case appears to be on thin ground, while the Ru!e case is the
better reasoned and the more modern view. Although the judge in the
Tailby case was not bound to follow the view of the Second District
in the Rule case,1'- the reasoning in Rule v. Rule should have been given
more than a mere passing reference. With the conflict in the appellate
court level between the Rule and Tailby decisions, a final determination 1)
the Illinois Supreme Court is most desirable. Affirmance of the theory of
Ritle v. Rule would seem preferable.
LABOR LAIJ'-INSULTING LANGUAGE ON THE
PICKET LINE
Defendant while acting as a picket was arrested for singing a song
which referred to -workers who refused to respect the picket lines as
"scahs" and "whores." Her defense was predicated on her constitutional
right of free speech. The Supreme Court of Virginia in upholding her
conviction declared constitutional a unique statute' making it a crime to
use insulting language which induces one to refrain from working.
McWhorter v. Covmion-wealtb, 191 Va. 857, 63 S.E. 2d 20 (195!).
Some thirty-three states have enacted statutes which protect the right to
work. - Constitutional attacks on these statutes predicated upon equal pro-
14 Bruton v. Tearle, 7 Cal. 2d 48, 59 P. 2d 953 (1936); Creager v. Superior Ct.,
i6 Cal. App. 280, 14 P. 2d 552 (1932); German v. German, 122 Conn. 155, 188 At].
49 (1936); Ostrander v. Ostrander, 19o Minn. 547, 252 N.W. 449 (1934); Fanchier v.
Gammill, 148 Miss. 723, 114 So. 813 (1927); Cousineau v. Cousineau, 155 Ore. t84,
61 P. 2d 897 (1936); Johnson v. Johnson, t96 S.C. 474, 13 S.E. 2d 593 (94); Shibley v.
Shiblev, 181 Wash. i66, 42 P. 2d 446 (1935). For a further discussion of this problem
and other cases falling under notes 12, 13 and 14, consult, Decree for alimony rendered
in another state or foreign country as subject to enforcement by equitable remedies
or by contempt proceedings, 97 A.L.R. 1197 (1935); io9 A.L.R. 652 (1937).
15 Decisions of one Illinois Appellate Court are not binding upon another. Hughes
v. Bandy, 336 II1. App. 472, 84 N.E. zd 664 (1949), aff'd 404 II. 74, 87 N.E. 2d 855
(1949).
1 "It shall be unlawful for any person singly or in concert with others to interfere
or attempt to interfere with another in the exercise of his right to work or enter upon
the performance of any lawful vocation, by the use of force, threats of violence
or intimidation, or by the use of insulting or threatening language directed towards
such person to induce or attempt to induce him to quit his employment." Va. Code
(1950) c. 229, § 4o-64.
2States not having such statutes are: Arizona, Delaware, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa,
Kansas. Kentucky, Louisiana, AMaiyland, Montana, New Mexico, North Carolina,
Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Utah, and Wyoming. Interfering with another's right to
work was not indictable at common law. State v. McGee, 8o Conn. 614, 69 Ad. io59
(1o8).
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tection3 and free speech4 have been unsuccessful. Insulting language has
never been held to be protected by the First Amendment.5 In NLRB v.
Maryland Drydock Company8 a federal court of appeals stated, in con-
sidering the extent of freedom of speech allowed in labor activities under
federal legislation: "The constitutional right of free speech nowhere means
freedom to wantonly lampoon or insult anyone." The Virginia court in
the McWhorter case was reluctant to hold that insulting language was not
protected by the First Amendment, stating: "The section [of the statute] is
not aimed at the use of 'insulting language' as such.... Its plain purpose is
to protect ... the right to work from the 'clear and present' danger of
destruction by those who, by the use of... insulting words would prevent
the exercise of that right."' 7 Insulting language is not like obscene, lewd, or
profane language. Oftentimes the freedom of dissemination of ideas
guaranteed by the First Amendment may be accomplished through lan-
guage which, to one group, is insulting, while only the highly imaginative
could conceive a situation where obscene, lewd, or profane language is an
essential part of free discussion. The Virginia court's ultimate reliance on
the "clear and present danger" rule was therefore on firmer ground than
its implication that insulting language is not the type of speech protected
from state abridgement by the Fourteenth Amendment, which curbs state
infringement of the right of free speech to the same extent that the First
Amendment limits the federal government.
Whether there is a danger to any right from certain activities depends
upon the extent of the right and the nature of the activities. The Virginia
statute should be considered in a light different from other state statutes
protecting the right to work. Inducing a person to refrain from exercising
his right to work is far different from preventing his exercise of that right.
"To prevent" connotes physical interference while "to induce" includes
persuasion without physical force.8 The danger inherent in activities pre-
venting the exercise of a right are far greater than those which seek to
induce another to forego the same privilege. The free right of choice of
3 Gurein v. State, 2o9 Ark._ o82, 193 S.W. 2d 997 (1946); Smith v. State, 207 Ark.
104, 179 S.W. 2d 185 (1944); Ex parte Sanford, i44 Tex. Cr. R. 430, 157 S.W. 2d 899
(1941), appeal denied 316 U.S. 647 (1942); Ex parte Frye, 143 Tex. Cr. R. 9, t56
S.W. 2d 531 (1941).
4 People v. Washburn, 285 Mich. 119, 28o N.W. 132 (938), appeal denied 305 U.S.
577 (939).
5 The use of insulting language in labor disputes has often been enjoined but always
there have been other acts of violence of which the language was a part. Great
Northern Railway Company v. Brosseau, 286 Fed. 414 (N.D., 1923) is a typical case.
6 183 F. 2d 538 (C.A. 4th, 1950).
7 McWhorter v. Commonwealth, 191 Va. 857, 864, 63 SE. 2d 20, 24 (1951).
8 The general judicial definition of "induce" is in accord with the standard dictionary
definition; thus it is considered synonomous with persuade, coax, prevail upon, or
move by persuasion or influence.
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employment is, under this type of statute, protected from any but the
fairest means of persuasive interference.
That insulting language, used in the course of a labor dispute, presents
a danger to the right to work cannot be denied. The use of the word
"scab" together with a distribution of Jack London's vile definition of the
word to a worker's neighbors had a marked effect in deterring a person
from crossing a picket line in a recent transportation industry strike. The
technique used by McWhorter was not so drastic, yet the insulting lan-
guage there resulted in the prostration of one woman and a marked de-
crease in the efficicncy of others. The effect of insulting language when
used by a picket is more pronounced than in other situations because
picketing itself, without violence and for a legitimate purpose, has been
recognized as having a coercive effect.9
Ultimately, the validity of these statutes will depend on the extent that
the Supreme Court of the United States will permit the states to abridge
the freedom of speech in order to protect the right to work. Speaking for
the Court in AFL v. American Sash & Door Company, Justice Black
wrote: ". .. concerning state laws we have said that the existence of evils
against which the law should afford protection 'is a matter for the legis-
lative judgment.' "o
The Virginia decision also can be supported by recent pronouncements
of the United States Supreme Court concerning labor activity and free-
domi of speech. Giboney v. Empire Storage Company" presents an apt
illustration of the conscious return of the Supreme Court to the earlier
constitutional principle allowing the states to forbid injurious practices in
their internal affairs.12 In enjoining peaceful picketing the court therein
said: "It has never been deemed an abridgement of freedom of speech to
make a course of conduct illegal merely because the conduct was in part
initiated, evidenced, or carried out by means of language either spoken,
written or printed."'1 Such a statement could well be applied to the situa-
tion in the instant case. Therefore, in the light of the Giboney case it
would seem that a statute prohibiting the use of insulting language during
a labor dispute for the purpose of inducing another to refrain from pur-
suing a lawful course of employment is not an abridgement of freedom of
speech.
9 Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U.S. 460 (195o); International Brotherhood of
reamsters v. Hanke, 339 U.S. 470 (195o); Building Service Union v. Gazzam, 339 U.S.
532 (1950); Bakery & Pastry Drivers & Helpers Local v. WAohl, 31.5 U.S. 769 (942).
10335 U.S. 538, 542 (1949); West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 400
(1937).
11 336 U.S. 490 (1949).
12 Lincoln Union v. Northwestern Company, 335 U.S. 525 (1949).
13 Giboney v. Empire Storage Co., 336 U.S. 490. 502 (1949).
